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About Those Constitutional Norms, Mr.
Attorney General
by Deborah Pearlstein
November 21, 2019

Among the many jaw-dropping moments in Attorney General Bill Barr’s address to the
Federalist Society last Friday was the assertion that he had been unable to glean from his
“friends on the other side” any clear answer as to what constitutional norms President
Donald Trump was really breaching. In his words:
When I ask my friends on the other side, what exactly are you referring to? I get
vacuous stares, followed by sputtering about the Travel Ban or some such thing.
Thanks to norms-tracking catalogues like Just Security’s and a rich and growing body of
scholarship on the topic since Trump’s election, the attorney general need not reach far
beyond his particular, “sputtering” friends for a more thorough accounting of exactly
which norms this president has trampled — from his manifest obstruction of justice
during the Russia investigation to his preference for acting officers over Senate
confirmed appointees, not to mention his use of the office of president to enrich himself
and his businesses. Indeed, the impeachment inquiry now underway – in which the
Trump administration refuses to provide witnesses and documents central to the
decision to block security assistance funds appropriated by Congress for Ukraine – offers
yet another example of presidential conduct chafing against established norms. Among
others, the president’s non-cooperation in the Ukraine investigation breaches the
bipartisan understanding that the president has a responsibility to come clean with
Congress about foreign affairs activities conducted in America’s name.
Ironically or not, we have a rich history of disputes between Congress and the executive
branch over foreign affairs to thank for the clarity of the norm that presidents should
inform Congress about their international undertakings. In the modern era, the response
to President Richard Nixon’s deeply controversial, secret air bombing campaign in
Cambodia helped solidify one such norm. At President Nixon’s insistence, the Pentagon

had developed an elaborate “dual reporting” system, making it possible for pilots and
navigators involved in the missions to file reports of fuel and ordinance use, but to
ensure that even the Pentagon’s already secret records would falsely show no indication
of any bombing runs into Cambodia. After one military flight supervisor expressed
concern about the falsification of records and asked who they were meant to keep the
information from, he was reportedly told, “the Foreign Relations Committee.”
Congress did not find out about the nature of the months-long bombing campaign until
July 1973, when a whistleblower reported it. Even before Watergate, it was the Cambodia
scandal that triggered the first resolution calling for Nixon’s impeachment and, more
importantly, led to the enactment of the War Powers Resolution (WPR) requirement of
congressional notification, passed by overwhelming bipartisan majorities over Nixon’s
veto. (Indeed, as opposed as he was to the WPR’s congressional authorization provision,
even Nixon came to endorse passage of its notification requirement.)
The pattern repeated itself not 20 years later, when the Reagan administration famously
tried to sell U.S. arms to Iran in exchange for the release of American hostages, and to
use the proceeds of those sales to support the Contra rebels’ insurgency against the
Nicaraguan government in violation of a federal law prohibiting U.S. assistance to the
group. Conscious that planned force-related activities would face staunch congressional
opposition, executive branch officials worked actively to conceal their actions from
Congress. After the Iran-Contra scandal came to light, it prompted sweeping
investigations by the executive branch, Congress, and a special counsel. And, after a 16percentage-point drop in President Ronald Reagan’s job approval rating — which one
poll described as the largest single drop for any U.S. president in history – Congress also
produced overwhelmingly bipartisan landmark legislation making it more difficult for
future administrations to keep the same kind of secrets again. Separate from the
legislation’s requirements, Reagan made “relevant excerpts” of his personal diaries
available to congressional investigators, and likewise took the position (embraced until
now by presidents since) that he would not use executive privilege to block congressional
inquiries into allegations of personal wrongdoing, illegal or unethical conduct in the
executive branch.

The point here is not that these historical episodes have changed, much less ended,
executive instincts to secrecy. They have not. But they do offer strong evidence of a
bipartisan norm that rejects presidential withholding of information from Congress
about significant foreign activities. For norms are distinguishable not because they stop
the suspect conduct; every norm or law for that matter is violated sometimes. What
distinguishes a norm as such is that its violation is met repeatedly with some form of
practical (social, political, professional, bureaucratic) disapproval.
And history is not the only evidence. I have had the pleasure over the past year of
surveying dozens of senior national security policy officials who served in the Bush and
Obama administrations, collecting their views on the role of law and lawyers in
constraining executive branch national security decision-making. The most senior
respondent served as a Cabinet secretary; the most junior served as a senior director on
the National Security Council staff. While the officials had widely divergent politics and
differing views on a variety of topics, there was stunning unanimity on a few points. The
necessity of congressional notification was one of them. Whether before a particular
force-related initiative or soon after, whether because they believed it would be illegal,
“un-American” or simply “unsustainable” – it was out of the question not to come clean
to Congress.
The current scandal is different from these past examples in important ways. The United
States did not secretly use military force in Ukraine, or secretly fund a rebel insurgency.
But as last week’s testimony made clear, the national security consequences of the
administration’s equivocation and delay were potentially just as serious. And in
withholding the delivery of critical and already congressionally appropriated military aid
to Ukraine, the Trump administration just as surely defied the will of Congress. Barr may
not like the current House investigation into the president’s withholding of security
assistance to Ukraine, but refusing to hand over information to Congress about how the
funds were stalled and why, definitely belongs on this administration’s growing list of
norms now breached.
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